Application of Game Theory in Middle-Management: A Military Historical Study of the Role of the Middle-Manager as a Correlated Equilibrium Factor in the Decision-Making Process

Authors

Quentin Commine, Jérémie Aboiron

Abstract

The role of the manager, defined by innumerable scientific publications, is only rarely seen through the prism of game theory and its notions of equilibrium allowing decision-makers to optimize situations. The role of the middle-manager, mindful of the human factor and respectful toward his mission shall lead to a virtuous balance, can be defined in game theory as a correlated equilibrium in the sense of the game theorist Robert Aumann. Indeed, this kind of equilibrium goes further than the Nash equilibrium by introducing the notion of a common game and an intermediary embedded in the decision-making process and getting the strategy from his superiors to translate it to his subordinated staff. We use two military historical illustrations to illustrate this concept: the case of the Auftragstaktik refers to Sherman's "march to the sea" while the study of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg refers to the necessity of having capable subordinated staff to maximize an outcome. Throughout this study, we show and formalize the essential role of the middle-manager in the elaboration of effective decisions and processes.

Suggested Citation (APA 7th)

Commine, Q., Aboiron, J. (2021). Application of Game Theory in Middle-Management: A Military Historical Study of the Role of the Middle-Manager as a Correlated Equilibrium Factor in the Decision-Making Process. International Journal of Applied Research in Business and Management, 2(1), 51-64. https://doi.org/10.51137/ijarbm.2021.2.1.5

Publication Information

International Journal of Applied Research in Business and Management
Volume: 2, Issue: 1, June 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.51137/ijarbm.2021.2.1.5

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